In this paper, I present the main traits of the phenomenological thinking of Abranches de Soveral. I start with the work of his master Miranda Barbosa explaining the criticisms he address to the Husserlian phenomenology. I show Soveral’s approach to phenomenology is framed by the conceptions of Barbosa and the problems that, for him, phenomenology cannot answer in an accurate way. In this context, I present the fundamental tenets of Soveral’s rejoinder to his master, showing how phenomenology can be rearranged (...) in order to formulate and to answer “the fundamental problem of knowledge”. (shrink)

En este artículo, examino algunas características importantes de las teorías de conciencia y autoconciencia de Brentano y Rosenthal. En particular, analizo la distinción entre estados mentales y estados conscientes, y la cuestión relacionada con de determinar si todos los estados mentales pueden convertirse en estados conscientes. Interpreto la teoría de Brentano como una teoría de la mente de un nivel que está de acuerdo con la fusión cartesiana entre los estados mentales y la conciencia. Argumento que los problemas que surgen (...) de la posición de Brentano son, hasta cierto punto, superados por una teoría de orden superior, de modo que la posición de Rosenthal es más precisa. Sin embargo, estoy en desacuerdo con ambos en la interpretación de la consciencia de un estado mental como autoconciencia. Desarrollo los fundamentos de una teoría basada en la primacía del organismo y su mundo vital, y de la experiencia consciente como la forma superior de la vida mental, que tiene, sin embargo, sus raíces en la compleja red de estados mentales que son no estados conscientes.In this paper, I examine some important features of Brentano’s and Rosenthal’s theories of consciousness and self-consciousness. In particular, I discuss the distinction between mental states and conscious states, and the related question of determining whether all mental states can become conscious states. I interpret Brentano’s theory as a one-level theory of mind which is in keeping with the Cartesian conflation between mental states and conscious-ness. I argue that the problems arising from Brentano’s position are to a certain extent surpassed by a higher-order theory, so that Rosenthal’s position is more accurate. Nevertheless, I disagree with both in the construal of the consciousness of a mental state as self-consciousness. I develop then the fundamentals for a theory based on the primacy of the organism and its vital world, and of conscious experience as the higher form of mental life, which has, however, its roots in the complex net of mental states which are not conscious states. (shrink)

Hemos ingeniado numerosos juegos para solazarnos; jugamos en las relaciones sociales desempeñando papeles con sus pertinentes máscaras; y el mundo semeja un gran juego que avanza subyugado por reglas, en el que, armados de nuestros saberes, jugamos para mantenernos vivos y vivir de la mejor manera. Mas aquí no se acaba el juego: resulta que el mundo, que es uno entre los posibles, debe de haberse impuesto, sin duda, a otras combinaciones de cartas en una recóndita partida de póquer de (...) un jugar inasible y difuso que rehúye nuestras concepciones. Porque, si bien de los juegos que hemos construido sabemos el qué, el para qué y el cómo, no podemos decir lo mismo del juego del mundo, inscrito a su vez en una maraña que juega sin límite y en la que nos vislumbramos. Por ello hemos de aclarar en qué consiste este juego último, para intentar descubrir a qué juega todo y a qué juega el ser humano. A ello ha venido consagrándose la Metafísica con estrategias varias: la Metafísica es también un juego, un juego de nociones, y a él se aplica este ensayo pretendiendo jugar con el mayor tino aun sin obtener ganancia. Así pues, este no es un libro de filosofía, contra lo que proclama el título; esto es un entretejido de partidas de un juego desesperado donde el jugador se juega el mundo, la vida, el pensamiento, el hombre y hasta a sí mismo. Con el molde del juego probaremos a concebir la realidad entera y a digerir la temática filosófica en sus tópicos más relevantes. Porque en este escrito la palabra juego funcionará como un significante flotante (en la nomenclatura estructuralista), como un valor simbólico cero, susceptible de aplicarse a cualquier fenómeno, y útil para conexionar nuestras inquietudes en los escenarios más diversos. Con dicha táctica, este libro recorrerá los problemas fundamentales de la filosofía para ofrecer al lector una visión aventurera al mismo tiempo que coherente. Empezando por un juego de solitario, el del Yo pensante, nos abriremos al pensamiento y al mundo, como juego en que participamos los hombres; veremos cómo en él se constituye el sentido o ser de las cosas, y cómo ese juego nos catapulta a un Gran Juego columbrado, al Juego de Ser (por llamarlo de algún modo), a un jugar sin sujeto y sin reglas al que no cabe aplicarle nuestras nociones. En tal juego intervenimos los hombres y efectuamos nuestras apuestas con los otros y con nosotros mismos y ante la muerte. Este libro se dirige a los jugadores genuinos, a los amantes del juego al margen de su resultado, dispuestos a los triunfos y a las derrotas, y a la derrota definitiva, sabedores de que todo es un juego después de todo. Emprenderemos, pues, un juego en sentido estricto y en sentido laxo, habida cuenta de que el ser y la nada, la verdad y el conocimiento, el mundo y las cosas, el hombre y el Yo pensante, la sociedad y la historia, el bien y el mal, Dios y el absurdo, la transcendencia y la muerte… son piezas, cartas o fichas con que nos hemos topado en un juego que nos abarca y al que nos sentimos arrojados. En cuanto juego, este libro, verdadero curso de filosofía para jugadores, aspira solo a que sus jugadas cuadren. (shrink)

Este artículo examina, de manera breve y panorámica, algunas contribuciones desarrolladas por el grupo de pensadores bolivianos y mexicanos Comuna dentro de la concepción de revolución del marxismo inicial de los pensadores Karl Marx y Federico Engels. Entre las contribuciones que se destacan se cuenta la producción de un marxismo situado que permite ver algunas complejidades no tomadas en cuenta por lo que Perry Anderson (2005) ha llamado “marxismo occidental”. Estos autores se sitúan desde el comunismo como identidad política de (...) una memoria espectral y desde allí desplazan la noción de una clase preexistente que contenga en sí las condiciones de emancipación universal. Estos autores señalan que el sujeto de la transformación social se construye en las condiciones de la lucha social y la lucha política frente a sus adversarios de clases en la disputa por el sentido común desde el Estado y más allá de este y el capital. Con ello estos autores generan una ruptura respecto del enlace entre sujeto universal y revolución desarrollado por Marx en el siglo XIX. (shrink)

O presente trabalho tem como tema central a educação científica antirracista. Fizemos uma problematização da Lei 10.639/2003 e da Resolução Consuni UFG nº 07/2015 para evidenciar que os referidos documentos transmitem uma ideia colonizadora. A pesquisa está fundamentada no pensamento decolonial, com destaque para as noções de colonialidade do saber e do poder. A metodologia empregada é a revisão bibliográfica, com ênfase nos principais pensadores do Grupo Modernidade/Colonialidade (M/C), como Aníbal Quijano (2005) e Ramón Grosfoguel (2016). A partir dessa base (...) teórica aplicada aos documentos legais, conclui-se que a Lei 10.639/2003 e a Resolução Consuni UFG nº 07/2015 possuem em seu texto ideias de natureza colonizadora, pois não se percebe no texto a voz daqueles que foram historicamente subjugados. Conclui-se também a importância de uma abordagem decolonial consistente na educação superior que para que se reconheça e valorize os saberes e conhecimentos dos povos marginalizados não apenas como objeto de estudo, mas como uma via para a construção de uma ciência antirracista mais consistente. (shrink)

Diversas evidencias parecen indicar que, durante la comprensión oral, el procesamiento del habla se realiza a partir de la información verbal auditiva y de la información viso-gestual proveniente del interlocutor. En este marco, se evaluó el tiempo y la precisión de respuestas de sujetos oyentes en una tarea de lectura labial con el patrón acústico suprimido. En ella, 25 participantes adultos, sin diagnóstico de patologías lingüísticas o cognitivas ni discapacidad auditiva o visual, debían distinguir si estaban frente a una palabra (...) del español a partir de la visualización de su articulación. Para la tarea se construyeron 240 estímulos, divididos en tres grupos de 80 ‘Palabras’ del español, 80 ‘Pseudopalabras’ del español y 80 ‘No-Palabras’, presentados en forma aleatoria. Los resultados respecto del tiempo de respuesta indicaron que las ‘Palabras’ (m=717,6ms) se reconocen con una velocidad menor que las ‘Pseudopalabras’ (m=809,5ms) y las ‘No-Palabras’ (7633,7ms); mientras que las ‘Pseudopalabras’ demoraron más en ser respondidas que las ‘No-Palabras’. Por su parte, en los resultados de precisión los estímulos presentaron el siguiente patrón de reconocimiento: ‘Palabras’<‘Pseudopalabras’<‘No-Palabras’ (correspondientes a un 59,89%, 62,5% y 86,3%, respectivamente). Del mismo modo, se encontró evidencia robusta de la relación entre el tipo de estímulo presentado y el acierto/desacierto de las respuestas, aunque el modelo indica que la condición ‘No-Palabra’ es reconocida con mayor facilidad y que la diferencia entre ‘Palabras’ y las ‘Pseudopalabras’ no es relevante. Asimismo, se observó una relación entre la menor velocidad y el desacierto en las respuestas. Estos datos corroboran la hipótesis de la integración de información proveniente de la percepción visual y el procesamiento del lenguaje, al mismo tiempo que permiten proyectar trabajos futuros con evidencias electrofisiológicas. (shrink)

O Volume Filosofia como modo de vida – Ensaios Escolhidos, organizado por Federico Testa e Marta Faustino, é um compêndio acadêmico com uma seleção de treze ensaios sobre o tema-título. Sua proposta principal é de apresentar ao mundo lusófono uma visão panorâmica do debate acadêmico, feito majoritariamente em língua inglesa, centralizado no tema hadotiano-foucaultiano da “filosofia como modo de vida”. Ou ainda, nos termos dos próprios organizadores, uma “cartografia do debate” (Pg. 44), muito bem-vinda no contexto brasileiro.

In this paper I discuss Berkeley’s theories about vision, perception of distance, and the foundations of Geometry. I start with Locke’s answer to Molineaux’s problem and the criticisms Berkeley addressed to it. I explain the fundamentais of Berkeley’s theory about our cognitive shaping of the visual field and the type of connections that visual data establishes with data from the haptic field. I show how interesting are Berkeley’s conceptions for a phenomenology of perception, and, eventually, I carried some phenomenological evidence (...) against Berkeley’s too much strict location of the idea of distance in the haptic field alone. (shrink)

I intend to understand from a phenomenological point of view the relationship between figurative consciousnesses (Bildbewusstsein) and other non-original presentations (Vergegenwiirtigungen) such as expectations, recollections or fantasies. I centre my analyses in the difference between figurative consciousness, on the one hand, and a modality of fantasy I cal! “daydream consciousness”, on the other. I stress that figurative consciousness implies apure observational ego, whereas day-dream consciousness is a free construction of the ego’s own personal story. The freedom of”day dream consciousness” has, (...) nevertheless, some important constraints. I emphasize the constraints that come from the passive and affective life of the ego. Finally, I propose new criteria for the phenomenological differentiation between the several kinds of acts of non-original presentation. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper we try to show how the discussion of Meinong’s distinction between distributed and undistributed objects was crucial for Husserl’s thinking about the phenomenology of time consciousness. The criticism of Meinong’s thesis that the representation of a distributed object (temporal object) is an undistributed act is presented as the central point for the development of Husserl’s own thesis about the perception as a continuum of continua and about consciousness as an unitary flux of temporal (...) phases. In a second part, we move to Brentano’s theory about original associations in the constitution of the “presence-time”. Brentano’s position about the function of phantasy as the origin of our representation of time is refused by Husserl and, as a result, the structural composition of time consciousness in phases of primal-impression, fresh memory (later “retention”) and immediate expectation (later “protention”) appears as the core form to the intuition of the present and the constitution of time. In a last section, we follow Husserl’s revision of his own analysis of fresh memory in order to understand his final position about retention as a primitive form of Vergegenwärtigung. (shrink)

In what follows, I intend to address an issue which is at the boundaries of the phenomenological method of reflective explication, and that, in this sense, points to some limitations of the phenomenological approach to consciousness and mind. I am referring to an aporetic situation that is at the heart of the phenomenological analysis of passivity. On the one hand, phenomenology shows, at least indirectly, a passive life that is beyond the first steps of the activity of the ego in (...) the receptive, affective life. This is something that is beyond the rising of an ego, and from which a phenomenology of the ego-form of subjective life could be addressed. On the other hand, the analytic and conceptual tools of the phenomenological method have no grips on this basic realm of subjective life. As a result, Husserl’s analysis of passivity starts with the evidence of a pre-affective, pre-egoic realm, from which a phenomenology of the ego could be developed. However, Husserl’s analyses end up with the denegation of this dimension, as if it was invisible for the phenomenological method. As a consequence, the starting point of the analysis is not passivity proper, but rather the primitive forms of receptivity, which is already a first layer of the activity of the ego. Instead of an analysis of the ego-polarization (the “birth” of the ego), the egoic layer of conscious life is simply presupposed. A phenomenology of the ego-form is, thus, at the same time promised and denied. This aporetic situation is visible in the alteration of the concept of a passive pre-givenness in Husserl’s Analysis Concerning Passive Synthesis. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the consistency and accuracy of Husserl’s sketch of a theory about non-declarative sentences in the last chapter of Logical Investigations. Whereas the consistency is acknowledged, the accuracy is denied, because Husserl’s treatment of non-declarative phrases such as questions or orders implies that those phrases contain, in some way, a declarative sentence and an objectifying act. To construct a question like “is A B?” as being equivalent to a pseudo-declarative sentence such as “I ask whether A (...) is B” is, however, a false phenomenological analysis, because to ask o r to order or to beg is not to assert. I turn, then, to John Austin ‘s theory of performative (as opposed to constatative) utterances and illocutionary acts in order to find a more accurate approach to the logical-semantic content of non-declarative sentences. Eventually, I show how this Husserlian theory of non-declarative sentences has a negative impact on the phenomenological theory of social ·acts and communication. (shrink)

Gustavo de Fraga was one of the most influential Portuguese phenomenologists. He had a deep understanding of the Husserlian as well as of the Heideggerian phenomenology. One of his major concerns was the connection between these thinkers, and the resettlement of metaphysical questions some step beyond the works of both. In so doing, Gustavo de Fraga took an original stance in the field of Phenomenology, combining conceptual and poetic experiences of thought.

I discuss, from a phenomenological point of view, the distinction between judgments and norms. I stress the limits of the husserlian canonical analysis in order to rightly account for the sense and content of normative intentionality. Based on some Kelsian insights, I draw a clear distinction between judgments and norms, criticizing some classical trends coming from Husserl himself that consider norms as a kind of intentionality founded upon objectifying acts. However, taking distance from Kelsen, Kaufmann, and Cossio, I stress that (...) the ought-proposition (Sollsatz) cannot be a good rendering of the sense-content of norms, based on the phenomenological distinction between the intentional matter and the quality of intentional acts. Finally, I propose my own account based on the concept of ‘ductive force’. I stress that the ductive force of norms cannot be identified witb simple coercion. [ show that there is, even inside the juridical sphere, a variety of ductive forces, going from sheer coercion to council and recommendation. To end, I stress the centrality of the concept of “ductive force” for a phenomenology of the social world. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the reappraisal of Husserl’s ontology and epistemology, sketched in book one of Ideen. The main issue is Husserl’s theory of essence and essential insight. I present the fundamental distinction between facts and essences, and, over and above it, Husserl’s defense of an a priori knowledge based on essential insight as well as his partition of the whole realm of a priori knowledge into a formal set of material, regional ontologies. I will show how the theory (...) of essential insight presented in Ideen gives rise to several criticisms, namely those made by Neo-Kantians, like Rickert and Natorp. In the last part, I will show how the mathematical concept of an invariant under a group of variations was the leading case for Husserl’s mature notion of eidetic insight. (shrink)

I sketch an analysis of observing as a particular attitude one can take regarding the surrounding world. I stress some particular features of observation, like the cancelling of the vital engagement. in the world, and the delight that pure observation involves. Then I move to a description of figurative consciousness and its image-world. In the final part, 1 try to show how watching movies displays a new type of observation, based on the empathic connection with the characters, the emergence of (...) a virtual body, and a self-decentered life, where the ego is not an onlooker, but something like an “ in-looker”. (shrink)

While not a phenomenologist, Fernando Gil was highly interested in some aspects of Husserl’s work. One of these aspects was Husserl’s theory of evidence. ln a notable book entitled Traité de l’évidence, he developed a throughout theory of evidence, paying close attention to the most important insights Husserl exposed his works. Gil’s theory of evidence is at the same time rooted in Phenomenology and extended beyond it in as much as he locates the first dimension of evidence ma primitive stratum (...) hallucinating aesthesia from desire. Accounting for evidence as threefold process, going from aesthesia to presence, and then to the intellectual grasping of an individual object, the most interesting feature of his theory is the of evidence as a hallucinating process, encompassing all strata of sensitive, perceptive, and conceptual life. (shrink)

I offer an outline of an integrated phenomenological analysis of free fantasy and of fictional worlds. My main concern amounts to stress the scissions entailed in free fantasy and in the consciousness of fictional objects: a scission of the I, and a scission of the experience. Firstly, I offer a somewhat new characterization of the presence of the objects of free fantasy, which disconnects any possible relationship of those objects with a real perception as the leading form of an originally (...) giving consciousness. My leading example is daydream. Secondly, I take the Husserlian analysis of neutralization as a conceptual tool to explain the consciousness of fictional worlds, against a new tendency for interpreting these worlds in light of the concept of “possible world”. The two approaches converge to a twofold characterization of the mode of being of fictions and of the modality of presence of the objects of fantasy. (shrink)

What, if any, are the limits of the Husserlian concept of Gegebenheit? Is there a limit beyond which nothing can be seen by the phenomenologist? In asking these questions, we allude to a distinction typical of Kantian criticism: “Grenze” or “Schranke”, limit or boundary? These same questions are reformulated in a famous review of Ideen I by Paul Natorp, a Marburg neo-Kantian who directly attacks the unlimited scope Husserl gives to the phenomenological principle of intuition. From a phenomenological point of (...) view, however, the Achilles’ heel of the critical method lies in the impossibility of accessing by intuition, beyond phenomena, the thing-in-itself. A major consequence is that the phenomenological dissolution of the “Grenze” prescribes a limitless opening to the horizon of phenomena. But if we can speak of a limitless openness, it is because in a certain way everything gives itself to be seen. What kind of vision is this? And what kind of Gegebenheit is at work here? The Husserlian answer lies in the recovery of a concept, the “idea in the Kantian sense”, without its counterpart, the “limit”, whereas for Kant as well as for Natorp it is precisely the concept of “limit” that characterizes the gnoseological status of the “idea”. (shrink)

I discuss Husserl’s concept of norm, and its relevance for a phenomenology of practical reason. I confront Husserl with Wilhelm Wundt, Hans Kelsen, and Carl Schmitt about, respectively, what a norm is, about the relation between theoretical and normative sciences, and, finally, about the creation of political concepts within European culture. In the last section, I develop some theoretical insights about the constitutive character of normative consciousness, abandoning Searle’s distinction between constitutive and regulative rules. I stress also the importance of (...) a phenomenology of plural and collective subjectivity in order to develop a phenomenological theory of state and normative experience. (shrink)

In this paper, I start with the opposition between the husserlian project of a phenomenology of the experience of time, started in 1905, and the mathematical and physical theory of time, as it comes out from the special theory of relativity, by Einstein, in the same year. Although the contrast between the two approaches is apparent, my aim is to show that the original program of Husserl’s time theory is the constitution of an objective time and a time of the (...) world, starting from the intuitive giveness of time, i.e., from time as it appears. To show this, I stress the structural similarity between the original question of time, by Husserl, and the problem of a phenomenology of the space constitution, as it was first developed in the husserlian manuscripts of the XIX century, in which we find the threefold question of the origin of our space representation, of the geometrization of intuitive space and the constitution of transcendent world space. Finally, I reconsider some of Husserl’s main theses about the phenomenological constitution of objective time in the light of the main results of special relativity time-theory, introducing several corrections to central assumptions that underlie Husserl’s theory of time. (shrink)

In this paper I try to show how transcendental logic can be interpreted in light of the distinction between apophantics and formal ontology. Despite the non-Kantian origin of these concepts, my contention is that they can reveal the scope of Kant’s argument regarding the distinction between formal and transcendental logic and the thesis that transcendental logic has a pure a priori content. While common approaches interpret this a priori content of transcendental logic as the content pure forms of aesthetics give, (...) we stress that this content is the a priori concepts of object which are embedded in the logical form of judgments. (shrink)

In this paper I address some philosophical questions regarding the impact quantum mechanics has in the classical conceptions about reality and knowledge. I stress that onto-gnosiological realism still is an option to the issues regarding the relationship between knowledge and reality. Rejecting some radical aspects of Copenhagen interpretation of quantum formalism, I emphasize the advantages of de Broglie’s realistic and causal model. To finish with, I discuss the limits of the Cartesian concept of matter and the split between matter and (...) mind. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine phenomenologically the structure of the normative noema, which I call the “nomothetic noema.” I distinguish the meaning content, its normative characters, which I call “ductive forces”, and its modes of givenness. Next, I introduce the traditional difference between modalities de re and de dicto. I argue that the current tendency, in deontic logic, to treat deontic expressions as operators over sentences induces, at least on the syntactic surface, a de dicto reading. I then discuss some (...) of the theoretical decisions that underlie deontic logic, starting from two basic asymmetries between modal alethic logic and deontic logic. The decisive point is to recover a strong sense of permission that I equate with the factor of free agency, which is difficult to formalize. Finally, I return to the analysis of the nomothetic noema and try to show how a de re reading is better suited to account for normative intentionality. I simultaneously introduce the concept of status-imposing norms, which must be formulated with a normative use of the copulas “is” and “has.” I conclude that the treatment of normative expressions is more appropriate when they are understood as complex copulas, irreducible to assertive sentences, rather than as operators over whole sentences. I emphasize on this occasion that, from a phenomenological point of view and within the framework of genetic analysis, the primitive basic datum is the freedom of agency, on which the normative domain of assigning statuses to agents, obligations, and prohibitions is built. (shrink)

SummaryIn 1905 the Campos Rodrigues Observatory was founded in Lourenço Marques, the capital of Mozambique, by then part of the Portuguese overseas empire. In this paper the inception and early history of the CRO are analysed in the broader context of the interwoven history of the Portuguese and British empires in Africa, and specifically with respect to the scientific relations between Mozambique and South Africa. The equipment, personnel, practices and networks involved in the inception and early development of the CRO (...) are brought into focus in order to illustrate the problems and strategies that shaped the establishment and functioning of this observatory, which was conceived essentially as a symbol of imperial stamina and colonial prowess. It is suggested that by providing a focal point for the development of scientific relations between Mozambique and South Africa, the CRO served both Portuguese ambitions for recognition as an imperial power and the emergence of South African nationalism. (shrink)

In this paper, I start with the opposition between the Husserlian project of a phenomenology of the experience of time, started in 1905, and the mathematical and physical theory of time as it comes out of Einstein’s special theory of relativity in the same year. Although the contrast between the two approaches is apparent, my aim is to show that the original program of Husserl’s time theory is the constitution of an objective time and a time of the world, starting (...) from the intuitive giveness of time, i.e., from time as it appears. To show this, I stress the structural similarity between Husserl’s original question of time and the problem of a phenomenology of space constitution as it was first developed in the his manuscripts from the nineteenth century, in which we find the threefold question of the origin of our representation of space, of the geometrization of intuitive space, and of the constitution of transcendent world space. Finally, I reconsider some of Husserl’s main theses about the phenomenological constitution of objective time in light of the main results of special relativity time-theory, introducing several corrections to central assumptions that underlie Husserl’s theory of time. (shrink)

In this article, I start with an analysis of Husserl’s description of the intentional structure of communicative intentions in the Logical Investigations, pointing to some obvious shortcomings of it. Then, I stress some important criticisms of Husserl’s approach, namely by Pfänder, and I endeavor to show that Husserl was very close to a full-fledged theory of communicative intentions in the years around 1910. I then turn to Reinach’s theory of social acts, without deciding whether Reinach’s approach was dependent or not (...) on Husserl’s new views concerning the intentionality of communicative acts. Regarding Reinach’s theory of the Vernehmung, I criticize a widespread trend to construe it as something like a perception, showing that it expresses what I call the “vocative element” of the communicative acts. Then, I point to some complements that Reinach’s description is in need, and I finish with an outline of a phenomenologically oriented concept of communication, based on Husserl’s and Reinach’s insights. (shrink)

Dans un contrepoint polémique au livre de A. Damásio, L'Erreur de Descartes, nous soutenons: que la thèse de l a «séparation» de l’âme et du corps permet, dans les écrits physiologiques de Descartes tels que le Traité de l'Homme, une réduction des fonctions végétative et sensitive aux processus mécaniques et naturels du corps humain; que l'in troduction d'une âme dans le corps se justifie, chez Descartes, par l'impossibilité de rendre raison de la rationalité du comportement humain et de la conscience (...) par les simples mécanismes physiologiques et la seule «disposition des organes». On montre, donc, que Descartes est, d'un côté, un des père s de la moderne approche neurologique qui est à l a base du livre de M. Damásio et, de l'autre, qu'il a vu d'avance une des limites d'une explication exclusivement neurologique de la complexité du comportement humain. (shrink)